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Juvenile Court Practice and
Procedure
By Glen W. Clark*

I.

LEGISLATION

The most significant change in the Georgia juvenile justice system
made by the 1980 general assembly is that effected by Senate Bill 489
which adds a new chapter, 24A-23A, to the Juvenile Court Code.' This
legislation establishes a new category of offenses called designated felony
acts, and sets up a special schedule of dispositions to go with it. Because
of their importance, the provisions of the new chapter will be set forth in
some detail before discussing their impact.
A designated felony act is defined as an act committed by a juvenile
thirteen or more years of age, which, if done by an adult would constitute
murder, rape, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, aggravated
assault, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated sodomy, armed robbery or
attempted murder or kidnapping.2 Whenever a child is adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a designated felony act, the new provision requires
the juvenile court judge to find, using a preponderance of the evidence
standard, whether or not the child requires restrictive custody, a new dispositional category created by the Act.8 If restrictive custody is ordered,
the juvenile will be placed in the custody of the Division of Youth Services for an initial period of five years, the first twelve to eighteen months
as determined by the judge to be spent in confinement at a Youth Development Center.4 If the juvenile has been found to have committed a prior
designated felony act, the term of confinement will be a mandatory eigh* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. University of
Montana (B.A., 1940; J.D., 1949); University of Colorado (M.A., 1966); Yale University
(L.L.M., 1968). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-23A (Supp. 1980).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2301a (Supp. 1980).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(a) (Supp. 1980).
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(1)(A) and (B) (Supp. 1980).
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teen months.' Early release from the Youth Development Center is authorized only upon court order.' In all cases, release will be followed by a
mandantory twelve-month period of "intensive supervision,"7 which can
only be shortened by court order.8 Release from intensive supervision after the mandatory twelve months is by written approval of the Director of
the Division of Youth Services or his designated deputy.' The juvenile
may not be discharged from Division custody in less than three years and
thereafter only if the court approves the release. 10 Youth Development
Center terms may be extended past the initial twelve to eighteen months
or any prior extension thereof by order of the court after a dispositional
hearing. This would be initiated by motion of the Division Director. In no
case could a juvenile be held past age twenty-one."
The standards set forth in the Act for determining if restrictive custody
is required include (1) the needs and best interests of the juvenile, (2) his
record and background, (3) the nature and circumstances of the offense
including whether personal injury occurred, (4) the need for protection of
the community, and (5) the age and physical condition of the victim."2
Restrictive custody is mandatory in any case in which a juvenile inflicts
serious physical injury upon a person aged sixty-two years or older during
commission of a designated felony act."8
The thrust of this legislation is clear. It is a response to growing frustration with the rehabilitative ideal which was the conceptual foundation
of the Georgia Juvenile Court Act of 1971" and most of the legislation
enacted by other states in the aftermath of In re Gault."s The substitution in designated felony cases of determinate sentences, set generally by
the legislature and within the legislative limits by the juvenile court
judges, for the indeterminate approach of the existing Juvenile Court
Code under which a child is released when rehabilitated, carries definite
connotations of a shift from the rehabilitative concept to one of punishment in the sense of retribution and deterrence. The standards outlined
in the preceding paragraph, except for the first one, bear this out.

5. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(e) (Supp. 1980).
6. GA. CODE ANN. §24A-2302a(d)(1)(D) (Supp. 1980). This section, however, is subject to
another interpretation. See text at note 30, infra.
7. Id. Section 24A-2301a defines "intensive supervision" as especially close monitoring
involving more frequent contacts than the present aftercare supervision.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(1)(D) (Supp. 1980).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1980).
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 1980).
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(3) (Supp. 1980).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(b) (Supp. 1980).
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(c) (Supp. 1980).
14. Current version at GA. CODE ANN. tit. 24A (1976).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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The shift of emphasis away from rehabilitation is also apparent in the
enlarged scope accorded judicial discretion in the disposition of serious
offenders at the expense of the Division of Youth Services. Until now, the
most drastic disposition available to the juvenile court judge in delinquency cases has been to commit the child to the Division." It was then
up to division personnel whether to place a child in a Youth Development
Center or to try its own form of probation-this, even though the judge
may have recommended commitment to a center. Under the new procedure, as to this class of offender, if the judge orders commitment that
order will be carried out. And the order will have been based on standards which give added weight to retribution, that is, to proportionality
between severity of the disposition and seriousness of the offense, and to
community security.
The designated felony act provision conforms with what is identifiable
as a national trend away from reliance on rehabilitation as the "polar
star" of juvenile justice in favor of greater emphasis on other justifications for offender sanction-retribution, deterrence and restraint, sometimes considered together under the term punishment.1 7 Tangible evidence of such a trend is not difficult to find. The IJA/ABA Juvenile
Justice Standards Project offers a prime example. The project established
classes of juvenile offenses, with determinate sentences of varying severity
to be made by the courts according to class. For example, a Class I offense, death or imprisonment for life or a term of more than twenty years
for an adult, could, for a child, result in secure confinement for a period
of twenty-four months.'8
The Juvenile Justice Act of 197710 of the State of Washington provides
another example. The purposes section of this Act states the legislature's
intent to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) ....
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal
behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and
criminal history of the juvenile offender.20

GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302(d) (1976) (Superseded 1980).
17. See Bay, Juvenile Justice in California: Changing Concepts, 7 AM. J. CRiM. L. 171
16.

(1979); Clark, Legal Policy and the Rehabilitative Reality, 2 OHIO N.L. REv. 231 (1974);

Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, 25 Juv. JUST. 2,
(Aug., 1974); Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court?, 25 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 281 (1979).
18. See Standard Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions § 6.2 (Tenative
Draft of 1977).
19. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 13.40 (Supp. 1980-81).
20. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (Supp. 1980-81).
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The Washington Act provides for the establishment of dispositional standards for all offenses, fixing determinate terms of confinement or other
disposition for the various offenses, not to exceed the period to which an
21
adult could be subjected for the same offense.
Recent revisions of other state juvenile codes show the same trend. Of
particular significance among them, since the courts there have already
considered its constitutionality, is New York's Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 1976.22 This enactment added a designated felony act/restrictive
placement procedure to the New York Family Court Act and appears to
have been the model on which the new Georgia provision was based.
The case which considered the constitutionality of the New York law,
and incidentally found it unconstitutional, was In re Felder,2 8 a 1978 family court case in Onondaga County. Although rendered by a court of limited jurisdiction, the opinion is noteworthy because its rationale would
appear to be directly applicable to the Georgia designated felony statute.
To begin with, the Felder court found that the New York designated
felony provision constituted a shift away from the rehabilitative theme
which had characterized the handling of juveniles prior to its adoption. In
the words of the court, the new provisions revealed a "thinly disguised
4
intent of the Legislature to punish an adjudicated designated felon.
The constitutional argument made by the respondent in Felder focused
on the right to jury trial. He argued that it was the benevolent rehabilitative character of the state's handling of juvenile offenders which justified
their being adjudicated delinquent in proceedings which could result in
loss of freedom without their being afforded all the procedural rights an
adult would receive if tried for the same offense. If the rehabilitative objective is replaced by punishment, the quid pro quo supporting procedural differences which have been recognized in juvenile trials no longer exists. The court concluded that since "the designated felony portions of
the [statute] are fundamentally criminal in nature, the respondent is entitled to a trial by jury for a criminal prosecution."' 5
In finding that the New York designated felony act provisions were punitive and thus criminal in nature, the court associated indeterminate
sentences with the rehabilitative approach-the subject of treatment is
released when he has been rehabilitated or cured, not upon expiration of
a fixed term of confinement set by a judge or the legislature. Determinate
sentences, in contrast, are inherently punitive. The factors according to
which they are fixed are proportional to the offense and need of the com21. Id. § 13.40.030.
22. N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT §§ 712(h) and 753-a (McKinney 1977).
23. 93 Misc. 2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1978).
24.
25.

Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,

402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
402 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
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munity for protection with, perhaps, considerations of deterrence also
given weight. That the juvenile under the New York plan would be given
treatment while serving his determinate period of confinement did not
change matters. As the court pointed out, "[wihat is at issue is the
'26
mandatory time period required for treatment.
I have indicated that the New York designated felony provision was
declared unconstitutional. That is not quite accurate, although the court's
decision had that effect. What the court actually did was to remove the
determinate term of confinement feature from the statute, 2' which effectively neutralized the legislative purpose for adopting it.
So, what about the constitutionality of the Georgia designated felony
act provisions? Juries are not used in juvenile courts in Georgia, 8 and if
the new sections constitute a shift from rehabilitation to punishment as
the dispositional objective in this class of cases, the rationale of the New
York decision would seem to apply. There may, however, be a distinguishing feature in Georgia's version of the statute which could save it,
and which warrants at least cursory examination.
Both the New York and the Georgia versions provide that secure commitments originally ordered for a definite term can be extended by court
order on motion of the division after a dispositional hearing. This indicates that the rehabilitative motif has not been completely abandoned.
Since the original term of commitment will have been based on considerations of retribution, deterrence and restraint, it is reasonable to infer that
the decision to extend would be based in large part on a determination by
the court that the juvenile had not been rehabilitated and could not
safely be returned to the community. This would be applicable, of course,
only for extension of otherwise determinate terms.
It is at the other end of the spectrum, where the question is one of
shortening otherwise determinate terms, that the New York and Georgia
versions differ. The New York statute makes no provision for early release of a juvenile on a designated felony act commitment. Unless the
term is extended, such a juvenile is released when the original term expires and not before. The court in Felder emphasized this point in characterizing restrictive commitments as determinate. The Georgia version,
which otherwise tracks its New York counterpart section on early release
almost verbatim, adds the words "unless by court order." These added
26.
27.

Id. at
Id. at

__,
-,

402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
402 N.Y.S.2d at 536.

28. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1801(a) (Supp. 1980).
29. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2302a(d)(1)(D) (Supp. 1980) which reads:
The juvenile may not be released from a Youth Development Center or transferred to a nonsecure facility during the period provided in subparagraph (B) of
this paragraph, nor may the juvenile be released from intensive supervision during
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words are crucial. If they are interpreted to apply both to release from a
Youth Development Center and to release from intensive supervision,
rather than just the latter, then it can be argued that Georgia has made
provision for rehabilitative considerations to be applied with respect to
shortening otherwise definite terms as well as to extending them. The
statute, according to this interpretation would, while introducing punitive
concepts into original dispositional decisions in designated felony cases,
permit rehabilitative considerations to override the determinate terms
originally assigned if the judge is convinced that rehabilitation has, or in
extension cases has not, occurred. Presumably this would be done on motion of the division and after a dispositional hearing as in the case of
extensions although the statute is silent on this. Responsibility for the
decision on whether or not rehabilitation has been accomplished, if this
interpretation is correct, will have been shifted from the Division of Children and Youth where it previously rested, to the Juvenile Court judge.
The rehabilitative ideal with the quid pro quo it generates, supporting
different procedures in juvenile and adult criminal courts, although deemphasized, will nevertheless remain alive. This could provide a basis for
upholding the constitutionality of the Georgia statute while acknowledging the soundness of the Felder rationale.
Other arguments can be made in support of the constitutionality of the
designated felony act provisions, and it is possible the Georgia courts
would uphold the legislation without distinguishing it from the New York
version in the manner described. Considerable advantages accrue to a
child adjudicated in the juvenile justice system as compared to an adult
even if dispositions are viewed as punishment. The duration of any determinate sentence authorized for a child would be much shorter. Other advantages exist in terms of confidentiality, sealing of records and place of
confinement. A quid pro quo for denial of jury trial might conceivably be
found in these considerations.
In the final analysis, if the need for a shift to punishment is real and it
cannot be effected any other way, the legislature might consider amending the Juvenile Court Code to provide for jury trial in designated felony
act cases. The procedural rights afforded juveniles are already in substantial conformance with those given adults in other respects. A six person
jury in this class of cases should not place an unreasonable burden on the
system.
Another significant change affecting juvenile court law was made by
House Bill 523 which amended Title 27 of the Georgia Code by adding a
the period provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph unless by court order ....

(emphasis added).
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new chapter"0 expressing a strong state policy that "restitution by those
found guilty of crimes to their victims is a primary concern of the criminal justice system.""1 The restitution policy is specifically made applicable to juvenile proceedings, but restitution is not to be given precedence
over the goals of rehabilitation and treatment in juvenile cases. 82 The juvenile courts are expressly authorized to order restitution as a condition
of probation.3 3 They may retain jurisdiction over a juvenile subject to a
restitution order for a reasonable period after he reaches majority for
purposes of insuring compliance with the order, 4 or as an alternative,
may transfer him to superior court for enforcement of the order. 85 The
Act requires that in deciding cases in which there are victims to whom
restitution could be made, written findings will be prepared indicating
whether restitution is appropriate.3 6 Failure to make such findings however, will not invalidate other parts of an order.3 The Act lists factors to
be considered in fixing the amount of restitution3 8 and provides that
while restitution will not bar civil action against an offender by the victim, payments made under a restitution order will constitute a set off
against any judgment awarded the victim.3 9
The age for legal purchase or knowing possession of alcoholic beverages
was raised from eighteen to nineteen by Senate Bill 68,40 and this, while
not amending the Juvenile Court Code itself, will have considerable impact in the juvenile area. The Act amends Georgia Code Ann. section 58612,4 ' adding a new section 58-612.1. 4 ' The Act makes it a misdemeanor
either to furnish, or permit an employee to furnish, alcoholic beverages to
anyone under nineteen years of age except for medical purposes, religious
ceremonies, or consumption in the home with parental consent. From the
standpoint of the consumer, it is unlawful for persons under nineteen to
purchase or knowingly possess alcoholic beverages, subject to the same
exception.4 3 Knowing and intentional purchase as agent for an underage

30.
31.
32.
33.

40.

41.

Id.

42.
43.

GA. CODE ANN. § 58-612.1 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 58-612.1(a) (Supp. 1980).

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ch. 27-30 (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3001 (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3005(a) (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3005(b) (Supp. 1980).

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§ 27-3005(c) (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3005(d) (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3008(a) (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3008(b) (Supp. 1980).
§ 27-3010 (Supp. 1980).

§ 27-3011

(Supp. 1980).

§ 58-612 (Supp. 1980).
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person is proscribed." Violations by the underage party are also established as misdemeanors. 4" The Act makes provision for a kind of informal
adjustment under which a first offender can be placed on probation without a judgment of guilt being entered if he consents to undergo a comprehensive rehabilitation program.46 Probation could last up to three years
and, if successfully completed, would lead to dismissal of the proceedings.4 7 The Act contains an overall exception for active members of the
regular armed forces of the United States. For them the legal drinking
age remains eighteen."
Section 8 of the Act may well present a problem for the juvenile courts.
According to this section, "nothing in this Act shall be construed to modify, amend, or supersede Title 24A, the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia,
as now or hereafter amended."' 4 9 What, then, will happen when a child
under seventeen violates the Act? Since violation is a misdemeanor, the
offender could be processed as a delinquent under Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-401(e)(1). 50 The Code, however, in section 24A-401(g)(7),O' defines an unruly child as one "patronizing any bar where alcoholic beverages are being sold, unaccompanied by the child's parents, guardian or
custodian; or possessing alcoholic beverages." This, in view of section 8 of
the Act quoted above, would seem to dictate handling a juvenile offender
in the unruly category. Which will it be? The answer, obviously, will
make a considerable difference in how the case is processed and the dispositions available to the juvenile court.
Another change to the Juvenile Court Code is made by House Bill
1147.52 This Act requires the juvenile court, within forty-eight hours of
learning of a juvenile who has committed an act which would be a felony
for an adult, to notify the district attorney in the judicial circuit in which
juvenile proceedings are to be instituted. 3 Also, under the provisions of
this Act, the district attorney is now required, if requested by the juvenile
court at least ninety-six hours in advance, to prosecute juvenile court
cases.8
Senate Bill 58055 is also of interest. It transfers all juvenile detention

44.
45.
46.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

47.
48.
49.

Id.

50.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

§
§

58-612.1(c) (Supp. 1980).
58-612.1(d) (Supp. 1980).
§ 58-612.1(e) (Supp. 1980).

§
§
§
§

58-612.3 (Supp. 1980).
58-612.4 (Supp. 1980).
24A-401(e)(1) (Supp. 1980).

24A-401(g)(7) (Supp. 1980).

§ 24A-1301(c) (Supp. 1980).

Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1801(d) (Supp. 1980).
See GA. CODE ANN. § 99-213(n) (Supp. 1980).
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facilities operated by counties to the control and jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Services, effective July 1, 1981." Counties will continue to
operate detention centers until that date. The Division of Youth Services
will reimburse, or partially reimburse, counties for the costs incurred in
operating the facilities pending transfer. Such transfers will not become
effective unless counties "transfer and deed to the State of Georgia the
real and personal property which comprise the offices, facilities and
equipment of such detention facilities, if such property is desired by the
State of Georgia. 0' 7 The Act also repeals the juvenile court judge's authority to appoint certain personnel, by deleting "employees of the detention home" from the list of employees judges are entitled to appoint."
Three resolutions were passed by the Georgia Senate and two by the
House which are relevant to the juvenile justice system. The first, Senate
Resolution 353,69 continues the Senate Juvenile Justice Study Committee
for another year. The committee consists of five members of the senate
who are appointed by the President of the Senate and is "authorized to
study and make recommendations regarding the entire juvenile justice
system of this state."0 It would appear from the resolution that the committee would function in the same manner as its predecessors. It was this
group which last year worked on Senate Bill 144 which would have established a standardized system of juvenile courts throughout the state and
which, having passed the senate in 1979, failed in the house in 1980 by a
single vote.
Senate Resolution 38161 created a Probation Officer and Detention
Facility Study Committee. According to the resolution, the primary aim
of this committee is to study "all aspects of" bringing probation personnel and detention facilities throughout the state under state supervision,
operation and control. This would include but not be limited to juvenile
probation officers and facilities. This committee, which also has five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate, is charged with making its report prior to December 1, 1980.
Senate Resolution 35861 created a Joint Child Abuse Study Committee.
The membership of this committee will consist of four Senators and two
citizens-at-large, appointed by the President of the Senate, and four
members of the House with two citizens-at-large appointed by the
Speaker.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.

58. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-603 (Supp. 1980).
59. Senate Resolution 353 (1980 Georgia General Assembly).
60. Id.
61.
62.

Senate Resolution 381 (1980 Georgia General Assembly).
1980 Ga. Laws 819.
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House Resolution 551-143763 proposed an amendment to the state constitution which would authorize the general assembly to "provide by local
law for the initial appointment and subsequent election of the Judge of
the Juvenile Court of Floyd County. '' 64 In the event the constitution is
amended and the necessary legislation enacted, the term of the judge
then sitting in Floyd County would be shortened and the new procedure
would take effect immediately.
The other House Resolution, number 483-1270,'5 proposed a constitutional amendment which would end the controversy associated with
venue under the 1971 Juvenile Court Code. Georgia Constitution article
VI, section 14, paragraph 6" provides that civil cases be tried in the
county where the defendant resides and criminal cases in the county
where the crime was committed. The Juvenile Court Code venue provisions 7 provide that in delinquency and unruly cases a proceeding may be
commenced in the county in which the acts occurred, and where deprivation is alleged in the county in which the child is present. The provision
for delinquency cases was upheld by rather strained reasoning in M.E.B.
v. State'" in 1973, but in 1978 the deprivation provision was held unconstitutional in Quire v. Clayton County Department of Family and Children's Services." The constitutional amendment, if adopted, would take
juvenile court cases out of the constitution insofar as venue is concerned.
The constitution as amended would read: "All other civil cases, except
juvenile court cases as may otherwise be provided by the Juvenile Court
Code of Georgia, shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides,
and all criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was
committed."7 The amendment would appear to resolve the problem.
II.

RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AFFECTING GEORGIA
JUVENME COURT LAW

In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co." the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the problem of confidentiality in the juvenile court. The case

63. 1980 Ga. Laws 2200.
64. Id.
65. 1980 Ga. Laws 2174.
66. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 14, 6, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4306 (1977).
67. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1101 (1976).
68. 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973), reaffirmed in G.S.K. v. State, 147 Ga. App. 571,
249 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
69. 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978). See PROGRAM MATERIALS 18TH ANNUAL WORKSHOP
FOR GEORGIA JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, p. 1.8, (Nov. 14-16, 1979).

70.
71.

1980 Ga. Laws at 2175.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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arose under a West Virginia statute7 2 which prohibited newspapers from
publishing the names of children involved in juvenile court proceedings
without a written order of the court, and made violation of the provision
a misdemeanor. The case is of particular interest in Georgia because
Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-3503(g),71 while differing in significant respects from the West Virginia statute bears enough resemblance to make
it constitutionally suspect under Smith.
In Smith, a juvenile was alleged to have shot and killed a fifteen year
old classmate. There were a number of eyewitnesses, and the juvenile was
arrested soon after the incident. The newspaper got his name from witnesses but in deference to the statute it initially refrained from publishing it. After three different radio stations had broadcast the name, however, The Daily Mail ran a story in which the juvenile was identified.
This story resulted in The Daily Mail being indicted for alleged knowing
publication of the name in violation of the West Virginia Code. At this
point the newspaper obtained a writ of prohibition against further prosecution alleging that the indictment was based on a statute which violated
the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution as
well as several provisions of the state constitution.
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court first considered
whether it constituted a prior restraint, which the state did not deny, and
concluded that, even if prior restraint were not involved, the statute
would still violate the first amendment because it punished the publication of information lawfully obtained. The first amendment tolerates this,
the Court said, only "when necessary to further an interest more substantial" than any presented in this case.74 First amendment values prevail
unless a state interest of the highest form is offered to justify their infringement.7 5 The state interest advanced here was that withholding the
identity of juvenile offenders is crucial to achieving the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system. This interest, the court held, while
substantial, does not justify the burden placed on the first amendment.70
Under the West Virginia statute the judge had discretion to permit the
publication of names, and the only restriction on press coverage of such
stories without judicial approval was use of the child's name itself which
the state argued was a minor restriction. While these factors were seen by
the court as mitigating infringement on the first amendment, the balance
of interests still favored publication. A major and perhaps fatal flaw in
the state's case was that the West Virginia statute only barred publica72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

W. VA. CODE § 49(7)(3) (1976).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3503(g) (1976).
443 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
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tion by newspapers and did not apply to electronic media. The statute
was thus incapable of accomplishing its stated objective of protecting
children."7
Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-3503(g)(1) 78 prohibits publication of the
name or picture of any child under the jurisdiction of the court for the
first time by any news media upon penalty of contempt, unless authorized by order of the court. This formulation is free of the West Virginia
vice which exempted electronic media, and it might also be argued that it
constitutes a lesser infringement on the first amendment inasmuch as it
applies only to first offenders. Nevertheless, it does punish violators, and
that was the essential fault the court found in the West Virginia statute.7"
Are there, then, constitutional problems with the Georgia provision?
The Court inferred that there might be in pointing out that "all fifty
states have statutes that provide in some way for confidentiality [of juvenile court proceedings], but only five including West Virginia, impose
criminal penalties on non-parties for publication of the identity of the
juvenile." 80 A footnote to this passage lists the other four states. Georgia
is one of them.
Another 1979 case in the U.S. Supreme Court, Fare v. Michael C.,O'
dealt with a Miranda8 2 problem which arose in a juvenile case. The Court
made the following statement in a footnote to the opinion: "we assume
without deciding that the Miranda principles [are] fully applicable to the
present proceedings. 's8 This is significant because the assumption that
Miranda fully applies is widely accepted. Juvenile justice is being administered on that assumption throughout the nation. Yet the Supreme
Court took the trouble to disclaim the idea that it was deciding that Miranda did fully apply. Gault, of course, held that the privilege against
self-incrimination applied to the adjudicatory stage in juvenile delinquency cases." However, Gault, although it mentioned Miranda,was not
clear that all of the adult law associated with self-incrimination was being
incorporated into the juvenile justice system. The extent to which the
constitutional gloss associated with procedural rights afforded adults in
criminal cases also applies in the juvenile system has never been made
clear by the Court, and it is unfortunate that, although not vital to its
decision, the Court did not take a position on the issue in Fare.

77. Id.

78.

GA. CODE ANN.

79.

443 U.S. at 105.

§ 3503(g)(1) (1976).

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

442 U.S.
Miranda
442 U.S.
387 U.S.

707 (1979).
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
at 717, note 4.
at 55.
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The specific issue in Fare was whether a request by a juvenile during
custodial interrogation to have his probation officer present per se invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent as it would have had he
requested the assistance of an attorney. The California Supreme Court
held that it did, but the U.S. Supreme Court did not agree. Although a
child might consider his probation officer a friend and a person whose
counsel he would like to have at such a time, probation officers are state
employees and as such cannot adequately fill the role of advocate for the
child. Neither did the child's having asked for his probation officer without more constitute a request to remain silent. The juvenile here continued to talk and he made statements which incriminated him. According
to the Supreme Court, whether a child intends to invoke his right to silence when he asks for his probation officer is a question of fact to be
decided on a case by case basis. Reviewing the facts, the Court decided
that there was no invocation of Miranda in this case.85

III. THE GEORGIA CASES
A.

Delinquency

The delinquency cases decided by the Georgia appellate courts last
year, while few, present some interesting and troublesome problems.
Lane v. Jones" is a good example of this. The Georgia Supreme Court
dealt once again in this case with the problem of concurrent jurisdiction
between juvenile and superior courts in capital felony cases. The fifteen
year old appellant in Lane, arrested on a warrant for murder, was being
held in the juvenile section of the Glynn County Detention Center pursuant to an order issued by the juvenile court. Acting on appellant's behalf,
the public defender tendered a petition alleging delinquency to the juvenile court in an apparent effort to force the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction. The juvenile court refused to accept the petition and appellant
filed for habeas corpus in superior court. On the day of the habeas corpus
hearing, but prior to its having begun, an indictment charging appellant
with murder was returned. The writ was denied, and the juvenile appealed, his theory being that the juvenile court judge, by refusing to file a
delinquency petition, allowed the case to be transferred to superior court
without the benefit of the transfer hearing required by Georgia Code Ann.
section 24A-2501. 87 This action, it was argued, violated due process of
law.
The court had little difficulty deciding against the appellant, but one is
85.
86.
87.

442 U.S. at 728.
244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 524 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (Supp. 1980).
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left with an uncomfortable feeling that all the problems associated with
concurrent jurisdiction have not yet been resolved. The court, referring to
Hartley v. Clack," pointed out that the juvenile court's detention order
did not vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court. Only the filing of a delinquency petition would have done that. Furthermore, Georgia Code Ann.
section 24A-16016 9 provides that juvenile court petitions will be filed only
after the judge or his authorized representative first decides that filing is
in "the best interest of the public and the child." The juvenile court judge
has discretion whether to file, and in this case he decided not to file pending action by the grand jury. The indictment, when it was returned,
vested jurisdiction in the superior court which was the first of the two
courts having concurrent jurisdiction to acquire it. Denial of the writ of
habeas corpus was not error.
Doubts persist, however, as to the manner in which these cases are being handled, perhaps because it is not always possible from reading the
opinions to know exactly what happened or the timing involved. For example, Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-1403(b) 90 requires that a child
subject to concurrent jurisdiction be detained only in juvenile facilities
pending a committal hearing under Georgia Code Ann. Chapter 27-4, 9"
or indictment. The Lane opinion makes no mention of a committal hearing; neither did Hartley. It was clear in Hartley that there was no juvenile detention hearing either. Lane is silent on this point and we do not
know from the opinion what kind of hearing if any was held before the
detention order was issued by the juvenile court. The problem with the
absence of a hearing at this point is that after an alleged juvenile capital
offender has been taken into custody but prior to the attachment of jurisdiction by either the juvenile or superior court, the child is in a legal
limbo. According to the Juvenile Court Code,9" such a child is to be
brought before the superior court. However, "pending a committal hearing

. . .

or indictment," absent special circumstances, he shall be placed

in detention only in juvenile facilities. This language suggests that following a committal hearing, further detention of the juvenile can be in adult
facilities. Yet, a later section 8 authorizes the use of adult detention facilities only after indictment. Where he is detained, however, does not determine which court has jurisdiction.
It would seem that if the district attorney intends to prosecute in the
adult system, the child should be processed throughout in that system
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1601 (1976).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1403(b) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. ch. 27-4 (1978).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1402(a)(4) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1403(c) (Supp. 1980).
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and have the benefit of whatever rights the system provides. For example,
in the adult system he should have a committal hearing and the state
should adhere to the time limitations on detention without one. If, on the
other hand, because the facility in which he is initially detained is a juvenile facility it is desired that the juvenile system handle the "committal"
decision, then it should be done under Georgia Code Ann. section 24A1404(c)" and the time limits established in that section should be met
including the seventy-two hour limit on filing a petition after the hearing." Unless the rules of one system or the other are followed, the child
risks receiving "the worst of both worlds.""
Another disquieting aspect of the concurrent jurisdiction problem is
the fact that when the district attorney decides, in the exercise of his
traditional charging discretion, that the alleged violation is a capital offense to be tried in superior court, this determination is made without
any semblance of procedural due process. If, on the other hand, juvenile
court jurisdiction attaches in a capital offense case and the decision to
prosecute in superior court is made by a judge rather than the district
attorney, a full due process hearing would be required.'7 Why require due
process when a judge decides, but none when the decision is made by a
district attorney? The effect on the juvenile is the same either way-if
tried in superior court he will be subjected to the full range of adult criminal sanctions. The usual answer to this question is that district attorneys
make these kinds of charging decisions every day. But the decision being
made here is more than a charging decision. It is a decision to shift the
trial from one system of justice to another. It is not, like the usual charging decision, just the first step in a long process of prosecution. It is the
final step in determining which system of sanctions the juvenile will be
subjected to, and the loss he risks seems grievous enough to warrant at
least a minimal level of procedural due process.
Much has been written on this subject and a number of cases in other
jurisdictions have dealt with it." For the most part, prosecutional discretion has withstood the challenges levelled against it.
In re C.M.M." involved a delinquency petition charging a fourteen year
old minor with kidnapping and motor vehicle theft. A motion was filed by

94.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 24A-1404(c) (Supp. 1980).

95. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1404(e) (Supp. 1980). See T.K. v. State, 126 Ga. App. 269, 190
S.E.2d 588 (1972) which points out that the two forms of hearing are analagous and serve
essentially the same functions.
96. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (Supp. 1980).
98. For example see U.S. v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cox v. U.S., 473 F.2d
334 (4th Cir. 1973).
99. 244 Ga. 787, 262 S.E.2d 103 (1979).
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the district attorney to transfer the case to superior court under Georgia
Code Ann. section 24A-2501. Some of the charges were transferred and
others were not. The primary issue presented on appeal apparently concerned the constitutionality of this transfer. The appellant argued that
section 24A-2501 was unconstitutional under the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment because it subjected a
child of fourteen to transfer if charged with a capital offense, whereas a
noncapital offender must be fifteen to be eligible for transfer. The court
rejected this contention, but the opinion does not contain either the rationale of appellant's arguments or any explanation of the court's reason for
rejecting it. The issue is therefore not suitable for development here.
Another aspect of C.M.M. which was more fully developed concerned
the fact that the waiver hearing was conducted in the first instance by a
referee. The appellants alleged, and appellees did not deny, that the referee failed to comply with Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-701(b). 00 That
section requires notice to the parties before any hearing conducted by a
referee is begun, and if they request, the matter will be heard by a judge
instead of the referee. It was also alleged that the referee failed to transmit findings and recommendations to the judge in writing with copies to
the parties, or to provide the parties with written notice of their right to a
rehearing before the judge. The court held that since the transfer order
entered by the referee and approved by the judge contained the referee's
findings and recommendations, this satisfied the first part of the allegation. Because there was no written notice of the right to a rehearing, however, the transfer order had to be reversed. The court explained its decision to reverse by pointing out that the only way an appellate court can
insure future observance of important safeguards such as those overlooked in this case is to reverse and remand.
The C.M.M. decision is perhaps not noteworthy in itself, but it
broaches issues which could conceivably be quite important. The reference is to Georgia Code Ann. section 24A-701' 0 on referees and whether
it might be subject to constitutional attack in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Swisher v. Brady.' Swisher dealt with a Maryland procedure under which masters were authorized to conduct hearings
in juvenile cases and to propose findings and recommendations for approval by judges. Where a master had heard a case, either party could file
exceptions, but the judge could act only on the record plus "such addi3
tional [relevant] evidence to which the parties raise no objection."'1
Swisher addressed the question of whether or not this procedure consti100. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-701(b) (1976).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-701 (1976).
102. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
103. Id. at 210-11, quoting Rule 911 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.
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tuted double jeopardy. The Court held that it did not, basing its decision
on the fact that no new evidence could be introduced at the time of review by the judge without consent of the juvenile, and further, because
under the Maryland scheme it was clear from the outset that only the
judge had final decisional authority. An earlier Maryland procedure had
been struck down by a federal district court'0 4 under the double jeopardy
clause because it provided for a de novo hearing before the judge whenever either party excepted to the master's findings. While the older Maryland procedure was not directly involved in Swisher, it was used by the
Court to illustrate a situation in which double jeopardy would be involved. The prime purposes of the double jeopardy clause are to avoid
giving the state opportunity in a second hearing to muster added evidence not brought out at a prior hearing, and to avoid subjecting a defendant to the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal of a second trial.' 1 6 In
view of this rationale a judicial hearing de novo following an earlier one
conducted by a master would constitute double jeopardy. The revised
Maryland procedure, however, did not violate this rule. There was no added risk that "an innocent defendant may be convicted. . . by taking the
question of guilt to a series of persons .

. .

empowered to make binding

determinations."10 6
The potential double jeopardy problem with the Georgia procedure
stems from the language of section 24A-701(d).10 7 This section provides
that following an initial hearing before a referee "a rehearing may be
ordered by the judge at any time and shall be ordered if a party files a
written request therefore within five days after receiving the notice required .

. . ."18

This proceeding would be a de novo hearing. It would

seem to provide the state a "second crack" at the defendant. It would also
subject him to the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal of a second
trial."'1 9 However, although two trials would seem to be possible under
the Georgia procedure, there may be a saving feature in the notice required to be given the juvenile that he has the option of being tried
before the judge in the first instance if he wishes. If, after receiving this
notice, the defense agrees to a hearing conducted by the referee, it is
arguable that the protection of the double jeopardy clause has been
waived.
L.C. v. State"10 was a delinquency case growing out of an attempted
104.

Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (Md. 1975).

105. 438 U.S. at 216.
106.

Id.

GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-701(d) (1976).
Id.
109. 438 U.S. at 216.
110. 151 Ga. App. 307, 259 S.E.2d 702 (1979).

107.
108.
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burglary. The facts are complicated and do not warrant repetition here.
The rule relied on by the court perhaps does. It constitutes a test for
circumstantial evidence and was well stated by the court as follows:
"Where the evidence tends to sustain two inconsistent propositions,
neither can be said to have been established by legitimate proof. Facts
which are consistent with either of two opposing theories prove
nothing."''
P.D. v. State"' dealt with rules of evidence which are not peculiar to
juvenile courts. J.E.T. v. State' 8 concerned an issue of substantive criminal law but is relevant to the juvenile system because it came up in a
juvenile case and could come up again. The question was how substantial
a step toward commission of a crime, robbery in this case, must the evidence show to constitute a criminal attempt. The answer the court gave
was that first, "there must be an act done in pursuance of the intent directly tending to the commission of the crime,"" 4 and secondly, such an
"alleged overt act or acts must be 'inexplicable as a lawful act' in order to
be more than mere preparation."" 5 The juvenile in this case admitted on
cross-examination that he and a friend had intended to rob the store. He
entered the store with a stocking cap hidden beneath a toboggan cap and
at one point pulled the stocking cap down over his eyes. He had a concealed weapon. The court found there had been an attempted armed robbery even though the juvenile had replaced the stocking cap to his forehead and his friend had returned a six-pack of beer to the cooler, after
which both had started to leave the store. The court suggested that delinquency would have been more easily proved had criminal conspiracy been
charged. In that event proof of an overt act in preparationto commit the
crime would have been enough."1
The only other Georgia delinquency case decided during the reporting
period which is deemed to warrant discussion was P.D. v. State.17 This
case dealt with the "speedy trial" issue. The juvenile here was charged
with delinquent acts based on the adult crime of aggravated assault. He
was "bound over" for trial, apparently at a detention hearing, and released to his father. Before a petition was filed, the father with the approval of the court, had the child admitted to West Paces Ferry Hospital
in Atlanta for psychiatric evaluation. The court formalized this action
with an order, and directed the father to make the hospital's evaluation
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 309, 259 S.E.2d at 703-04.
151 Ga. App. 662, 261 S.E.2d 413 (1979).
151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979).
Id. at 838, 261 S.E.2d at 754.
Id. at 839, 261 S.E.2d at 754 (emphasis added).
Id.
No. 59756 (Ga. Ct. App., decided April 30, 1980).
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report available to the court when received. Further action was stayed
pending receipt of the report.
One hundred seventy-one days later, an adjudication hearing was held,
a delinquency petition having been filed on the same day. The hearing
date had been fixed in an order seven days earlier. The child was found
delinquent and committed to the Division of Children and Youth.
The court upheld this procedure saying that the rule requiring filing of
a petition within thirty days after release of a juvenile to his parents 18
was not violated inasmuch as the juvenile here was not "released." He
was in the psychiatric ward of a hospital and had been committed there
by his father which was satisfactory with the juvenile court.
B. Deprivation and Termination of ParentalRights
Henderson v. Department of Human Resources,'" a termination of parental rights case, is of interest from two standpoints. First, in considering whether the appellant father's right to consent to termination had
been forfeited by failure to pay court ordered child support,11 0 the court
of appeals credited the father with disability benefits paid to his children
by Social Security on his behalf. 1 1 Since the amounts of such payments
were not disclosed by the evidence, the court found that the right had not
been forfeited. The court was unable to determine if the court-ordered
payment schedule had been met since it did not know the amounts of the
Social Security checks. The court did terminate the father's rights, however, on the general ground that insofar as appellant was concerned, the
children were deprived, the deprivation was likely to continue, and the
children were likely to suffer serious mental, physical and emotional
harm.11 The facts supporting these findings were as follows: the father
was a drug addict and in the court's words "has a record of felony arrests
since before the children's births, has spent more than a third of their
lives in prison, and has not provided a home for the children."'"28 In stating the facts, the court pointed out that the father had contributed only
sixty-five dollars of his own funds to support the children over a six year
period although he had earnings in and out of prison of about $2,100.00
during that period. It was also pointed out that he had not visited or
contacted the children during a five week parole. The weight given these
facts by the court indicates that while parental conduct suggesting abanGA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1404(b) (Supp. 1980).
119. 152 Ga. App. 74, 262 S.E.2d 241 (1980).
120. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3201(a)(4) (Supp. 1980).
121. Citing Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963).
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3201(a)(2) (Supp. 1980).
118.

123.

152 Ga. App. at 77, 262 S.E.2d at 243.
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donment may be insufficient for termination without consent under the
specific code provisions on abandonment or nonsupport, such conduct
will be considered under the general ground.
The court in Henderson stated the following as the rule governing termination without parental consent under the general ground:
While the termination of parental rights is a severe measure, a termination hearing seeks above all else the welfare of the child, and in determining how the best interest of the child is served, the juvenile court is
vested with a broad discretion which will not be controlled in the absence
of manifest abuse.lu
Two other cases decided by the court of appeals during the survey period applied a child welfare oriented standard in terminating parental
rights. ' 5 Another case, Cox v. Department of Human Resources,"" also
upheld termination, but explained its holding more in terms of parental
fitness than of the best interests of the child. The court of appeals in that
case approved the trial court's conclusion that "because of his age, his
physical condition, and because of his inability to understand basic parental skills, [appellant] would be unable to provide the child with proper
parental care and control."1' ' The juvenile court had found that the child
was often filthy, was given spoiled milk, and that appellant's home "had
no indoor plumbing and that the exterior looked like a junkyard."e"The
parental rights of this appellant to an older daughter had been terminated in an earlier case.1 '
The reason for noting what might seem a fine point of emphasis in stating the general termination standard is traceable to a long standing controversy associated with termination as well as with parent versus thirdparty custody cases in the Georgia law.18 0 The issue of whether the focus
124. Id., 262 S.E.2d at 243-44.
125. Hood v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 219, 257 S.E.2d 340 (1979);
Kilgore v. Dep't of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. 19, 258 S.E.2d 680 (1979).
126. 151 Ga. App. 257, 259 S.E.2d 664 (1979).
127. Id. at 259, 259 S.E.2d at 666.
128. Id. at 258, 259 S.E.2d at 666.
129. Cox v. Dep't of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 43, 250 S.E.2d 839 (1978).
130. See McGough, Juvenile Court Practiceand Procedure, 31 MERCER L. REV. 143 at
152-53 (1979). This was last year's Survey of Georgia Juvenile Court law, and it contains a
good discussion of the problem. See also, McGough and Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best
Interests of the Child Standardin Parent-ThirdParty Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY LAW
JOURNAL 209 (1978). Further discussion of the conflict between the parental rights and child
welfare standards in termination cases is contained in appellee's brief in the case of Wilma
L.N. Ray v. Dep't of Human Resources, Case No. 59869 in the Court of Appeals, by Assistant Attorney General Carol Cosgrove. This brief is reproduced in the materials of the
SPRING SEMINAR FOR GEORGIA JUVENILE JUDGES, MAY 29-31, 1980, INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING
JUDICIAL EDUCATION, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Ga., 30602. The relevant
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should be on a parent's fitness to raise a child properly or a child's interest in being properly raised may seem "six of one or a half dozen of the
other," but the consequences can be of profound importance as Professor
McGough has pointed out.18 1 This is particularly true if a requirement for
parental fault in having brought about the unsatisfactory condition is introduced. The child welfare emphasis, of course, contemplates freeing the
child from a harmful biological tie to facilitate his incorporation into a
wholesome family relationship through adoption.
The current year's cases provided support for the child's welfare focus.
This conclusion is buttressed to some extent by a Georgia Supreme Court
decision, In re M.A.C., 8 8 which used child welfare language in upholding
a termination. The case does not provide strong precedent, however. The
parental conduct was flagrant enough almost certainly to have justified
termination under either approach and the formulation of the standard
quoted by the court includes elements of both positions."' 8
Another court of appeals case,'" without discussing what rule was being applied, found the following circumstances to be sufficient evidence of
deprivation to terminate parental rights under the general ground:
[T]hat at the time of the termination hearing, appellant was incarcerated
under a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault; that appellant made no
attempt to legitimate the child; that appellant never contributed to the
support of the child; and that neither appellant nor his family had contacted the child's custodian regarding the child's welfare. 8 '
A number of termination cases decided during the survey period dealt
with procedural matters. In M.A.C., appellant argued that the provisions
for notice to out-of-state parties set forth in Georgia Code Ann. section
24A-1702 1 3 were unconstitutional on both equal protection (as between
portions are at pages 5.68 to 5.74.
131. McGough, supra, 31 MERcER L. REV. 143 at 153-54.
132. 244 Ga. 645, 261 S.E.2d 590 (1979).
133. The Court quoted from Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Services,
136 Ga. App. 251, 255, 220 S.E.2d 726, 729 (1975), a case generally considered to express the
child welfare philosophy, as follows:
The thread running through [cases in which parental rights were terminated on
the ground that the child or children were deprived) not only manifests moral
unfitness, physical abuse and abandonment by the parent or parents but also
reflects a condition of frequent moves from home to home thereby lessening the
probability of a meaningful parent-child relationship as well as probable deprivation of a sound environment founded in love and nurture. These cases found a
substantial danger of a child suffering emotional harm as well as physical,
mental, or moral harm (emphasis in original).
134. Gunter v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 550, 258 S.E.2d 260 (1979).
135. Id.
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1702 (1976).
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in-state and out-of-state parties) and due process grounds. The court
found no equal protection problem, because it considered both classes to
have been treated the same. As far as the due process argument that five
days notice to out-of-state parties by registered or certified mail did not
meet U.S. constitutional standards, 13 7 the court held that appellant did
not have standing to attack the statute since she had in fact received
seventy days notice and her attorney had admitted at the hearing that
she had been notified in ample time. Appellant's argument that the children were residents of Pennsylvania, since that was the mother's state of
residence, was rejected by the court on the basis of the venue provisions
of the Georgia Juvenile Court Code 8 8 which provide that deprivation
cases can be brought in the county where the child is present when the
case is commenced. That this provision has been held unconstitutional
under the Georgia Constitution8 9 would, according to the court, not benefit a nonresident of Georgia. The court also found, in response to a third
argument advanced by appellant, that sufficient "minimum contacts"
with the state of Georgia existed to justify the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over her in this proceeding.1 4 0 The children having been left
in Georgia, appellant having received child support payments in Georgia
before leaving the state, her voluntarily having turned the children over
to a Georgia state agency when she left and the fact they had been in
foster care in Georgia provided sufficient contacts.
The requirement that trial courts set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law in orders terminating parental rights was an issue in three
cases decided by the court of appeals. In McCary v. Department of
Human Resources,"" the trial court stated no findings or conclusions. In
reversing, the court of appeals pointed out that such findings should be
made pursuant to section 52(a) of the Georgia Civil Practice Act." 81 Patty
v. Department of Human Resources14 3 was reversed because, although
the order stated that the child was deprived and that the conditions of
deprivation were likely to continue, it did not include a finding that "by
reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral or emotional harm.""' Williams v. Department of

137. 244 Ga. at 648, 261 S.E.2d at 593, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
138. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1101 (1976).
139. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Services, 242 Ga. 85, 249
S.E.2d 538 (1978).
140. Appellant's argument was based on Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
141. 151 Ga. App. 181, 259 S.E.2d 181 (1979).
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-152(a) (1977).
143. 151 Ga. App. 555, 260 S.E.2d 551 (1979).
144. Id.
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Human Resources1 4' was reversed for lack of factual findings supporting
venue and jurisdiction over the person of the appellant. Appellant was
incarcerated at Reidsville, having been sentenced at a criminal trial conducted in Montgomery County. These circumstances did not establish
that he was a resident of Montgomery County for purposes of venue in
the termination proceeding since criminal trials are tried in the county
where the offense is committed.
The use of caseworker's written reports at adjudicatory hearings in termination cases was considered again in Wooten v. Department of Human
Resources.14 The Juvenile Court Code, section 24A-2201(d),1 47 provides
for use of written caseworker reports at dispositional hearings if copies
are made available to the parties on request and the person making the
report is available for cross-examination. But this does not apply to adjudicatory hearings. Prior cases have recognized that admission of such reports into evidence at adjudicatory hearings is a technical violation of the
code but have held the error not reversible where the caseworker was
available for cross-examination and sufficient evidence existed to support
the court's findings of fact without considering the hearsay. The judge is
presumed capable of separating hearsay from direct evidence and relying
only on the direct. Termination was reversed in Wooten, however, because the caseworker although subjected to cross-examination had been
on the case only a short time and reports were admitted which antedated
her assignment to the case and dealt with matters about which she had
no personal knowledge. Furthermore, appellant was not allowed access to
all of the records taken into consideration by the juvenile court. The
court found that the termination order was based on hearsay in this case.
Department of Human Resources v. Ledbetter"' dealt with the problem of custody assignment where termination of parental rights leaves a
child with no parent. The father in Ledbetter was prepared to relinquish
parental rights voluntarily and the grandparents on the deceased
mother's side 14 9 sought through intervention to have the children placed
in their permanent custody. Were this permitted, the grandparents would
have power to consent to any future adoption 8 0 and, subject to the requirement for judicial review if no adoption took place within two

145. 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979).
146. 152 Ga. App. 304, 262 S.E.2d 583 (1979). The question had been previously considered in Moss v. Moss, 135 Ga. App. 401, 218 S.E.2d 93 (1975) and In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737,
251 S.E.2d 299 (1978).
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GA. CODE ANN.

§ 24A-2201(d) (1976).

148. 153 Ga. App. 416, 265 S.E.2d 337 (1980).
149. Actually they were grandparents through virtual adoption of the mother who had
been their niece.
150. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3204(a) (1976).
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years, 5 ' would be in a dominant position with respect to adoption of the
children. The argument for this result was based on the Juvenile Court
Code section authorizing placement of custody in "the Division of Children and Youth or a licensed child-placing agency, willing to accept custody for the purpose of placing the child for adoption, or in the absence
thereof in a foster home or take other suitable measures for the care and
welfare of the child."1' Assignment of custody to the grandparents under
the last clause of this provision would, in effect, be placing the child for
adoption with the grandparents. If this were done, the court would have
made itself the selecting agent of an adoptive family rather than an approving agent as contemplated by the statutory scheme. The court of appeals held that this was not the result intended and that custody awards
in such cases should be made according to the precedence announced in
the code. In other words, first priority should be given the Department of
Human Resources, the state agency charged with placement for adoption.
If this is not feasible, custody should be assigned to a licensed child
placement agency, a foster home, or, last priority, to "some other undesignated receiver. 1 58 Foster parents should not be allowed to intervene with
a view toward enhancing their prospects for adoption.'" Foster parents
may, of course, seek adoption through established procedures.

151.
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